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A History of Religious Freedom in Italy*
President Francesco Cossiga of the Republic of Italy**
I am honored and grateful for the Honorary Degree in Humane
Letters which has been conferred upon me by this distinguished
Loyola University.
It honors me both as an Italian and as a Catholic: as an Italian,
in that it is an acknowledgement of the contribution that my coun-
try has made, and continues to make, to culture and the progress
of mankind, especially in the fields of law and justice; as a Catholic
who is deeply conscious of the important place your University
occupies in American life, bearing testimony to the Catholic
Church's interest in and love for culture and the general advance-
ment of authentic human values.
Precisely in order to manifest my awareness of the importance
that I, as a legal scholar and a member of the Catholic Church,
* The following is an address given during Commencement, January 11, 1992, at
Loyola University Chicago.
The Journal thanks the Italian Consulate for providing the written translation from
Italian into English, the Italian Cultural Institute for its invaluable assistance, and Dr.
Barbara Carle of Loyola University and Loyola Law student Br. Owen Meegan, FS.C.,
for their vital contributions.
** President Francesco Cossiga was elected President of the Republic of Italy in
1985, and served until he resigned in April 1992. Born in Sardinia, Cossiga is the son of a
middle-class family whose origins are both humble and scholarly. One of the President's
great-grandfathers was well known as "the Christian poet" and wrote in Lugodorese, a
Sardinian language. Francesco Cossiga graduated in law from Sassari University where
he began his academic career. He is the author of several legal works and a specialist in
constitutional law. He also has played an active, important role in various Catholic
movements and has scholarly knowledge of the work of philosopher and theologian Car-
dinal John Henry Newman. President Cossiga was elected Deputy to the Italian Parlia-
ment in 1958 and served several times on the Bureau of the Parliamentary Christian
Democratic Group. His work in government as a minister began in a coalition under
Prime Minister Aldo Moro, whose teachings and examples have always inspired Presi-
dent Cossiga's public and political life. President Cossiga held important positions in
several different administrations until he was elected President in 1985. Some of the main
concerns of his political career have included institutional policy, defense, and security.
President Cossiga has received special degrees from a long list of institutions including
York University in Canada, Barcelona University in Spain, and Columbia and St. John's
Universities in New York. He also has been honored by Oxford and Yale Universities.
Among other distinctions, he is a Knight of Malta and has awards and decorations from
more than twenty countries. At this Commencement address, Loyola University Chi-
cago presented Francesco Cossiga with the degree Doctor of Humane Letters honoris
causa.
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attribute to this degree, I would like to dwell briefly on the manner
in which religious freedom is guaranteed in my own country. I
have also chosen this subject as a sincere and dutiful act of homage
to those theologians and jurists of the Society of Jesus to whom I
owe a great debt of gratitude, admiration, and affection as a lay-
man: men who have made such a great contribution to civil soci-
ety and to the ecclesial community by developing and establishing
the concept and the practical principle of the right of all men to
religious freedom.
Concluding his work on The Travail of Religious Liberty,' Ro-
land Bainton realized that he had gone beyond the immediate
problem of religious freedom to discuss every freedom. But he jus-
tified it by the fact that all freedoms are bound together, and that
civil freedoms very rarely thrive where religious freedoms are not
guaranteed, and vice versa. For Bainton, underlying all these free-
doms is a philosophy of freedom that presupposes a varied range of
human behavior patterns, honors the integrity and respects the dig-
nity of man, and seeks to follow the example of the compassion of
God.
There was nothing novel about this idea of the solidarity be-
tween all freedoms. As I shall be saying shortly, the same idea had
already been expressed by a great Italian jurist, Francesco Ruffini,
who said it is the spirit of tolerance that underlies each of the free-
doms. Yet these statements emphasize the similarities between the
approach of historians and theologians--of whom Bainton stands
out as the epitome of the scholars of these disciplines-and the
reasoning of jurists, albeit with cultural and conceptual differences,
who have long placed great emphasis on the indivisible bond link-
ing all freedoms.
At the end of the last century in one of the most comprehensive
general theories of subjective public rights ever published,2 George
Jellinek described the "status libertatis" as the eminently negative
juridical status, on the ground that rights to freedom are nothing
other than manifestations of one single right, which is specified
through many prerogatives that have been claimed throughout his-
tory and affirmed to offset restrictions imposed in the past. This
structurally unitary construction of the "right to freedom" cer-
tainly elevated the bond that links all freedoms, but it ultimately
1. ROLAND BAINTON, THE TRAVAIL OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Philadelphia, West-
minster Press 1951).
2. GEORGE JELLINEK, DAS SYSTEM DER SUBJECTIVAN OFFENTLICHEN RECHTE
(1892).
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viewed freedom merely as exemption from illegal constraints: this
basically creates the equation "freedom-legality." And this con-
clusion is certainly fully consistent with the overall view of subjec-
tive public rights as the reflex of self-limitation by the State. The
essence and the mode of being of all freedoms are ultimately left to
decisions taken by the State.
What is of relevance here, namely, the solidarity of all freedoms
as emphasized by Bainton, is also affirmed by conceiving of free-
doms not as a unified whole, but as many individually distinct
rights, each one specifically defined and protected in terms of the
interest at issue.
In the early decades of the Nineteenth Century, a saintly priest,
a great philosopher and theologian, and an Italian patriot, Antonio
Rosmini, held that the right to religious freedom, like every sub-
stantial right, is based on the nature and the dignity of the human
person. The whole rationale underlying his view is the fact that
"the person is the source of law: indeed, the person is the embodi-
ment of law."
"History has taught us that citizens did not assert, fight for and
defend any single, generic freedom by waging glorious battles
throughout the ages, but certain specific and distinct freedoms, be-
ginning with the freedom of religion, wresting them one by one
from sovereign absolutism."' 3 These were the incisive words of
Francesco Ruffini, a distinguished Italian historian and jurist, and
a great defender of civil rights against the authoritarianism that
was becoming established in our country at the time. In his Course
of Italian Ecclesiastical Law,4 he based the right to freedom, and
primarily religious freedom, on the concrete reality of historical
experience, severing these rights from over-rigid dogmatism, but
without ever losing sight of the juridical essence of freedom. And
when Ruffini so masterfully set out the history of the idea of reli-
gious freedom in his earlier work, he said that it is not "a philo-
sophical concept or principle," or even "a theological concept or
principle," but "an essentially juridical concept or principle: ...
religious freedom does not take the side of the faith or unbelief; but
in that unremitting struggle that has been fought between them
ever since man has existed and will perhaps continue so long as
man exists, religious freedom stands absolutely aloof."' The pur-
3. FRANCESCO RUFFINI, Corso di diritto ecclesiastico italiano, in LA LIBERTA RE-
LIGOSA COME DIRITTO PUBBLICO ITALIANO 185 (Torino, Bocca 1924).
4. Id.
5. 1 FRANCESCO RUFFINI, La liberta religiosa-Storia dell'idea 7 (Milano 1967).
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pose of religious freedom, according to Ruffini, is
wholly practical. And it consists of creating and maintaining a
state of affairs in society such that every individual may pursue
and acquire for himself those two supreme ends (faith or free
thought) without other men, individually or grouped together in
associations or epitomized in that supreme community of all
which is the State, being able to raise the slightest obstacle or
inflict the least damage by so doing.6
Francesco Ruffini later clarified the basis of the rights of freedom
in a book published in 1926 by Piero Gobetti,7 the fearless young
liberal leader after the First World War who died as a result of the
blows inflicted on him by violent politicians, which was "a political
battle before being an essay on law." This publication, which soon
became unobtainable, was a "passionate defense of the rights of
freedom, in which the jurist lends a hand to the historian and the
politician," and it was a bold act of faith in his own ideals at a time
in which freedoms had been placed in jeopardy.8
The rights to freedom, according to Ruffini, do not stem from
self-limitation by the State and are not subsequent to the State.
Out of respect for the citizens' Rights of freedom, the freedom of
the State ... is not a voluntary limitation acquired by the State,
but rather a necessary and congenital limitation. Hence the invi-
olability, hence the inalienability of these Rights of freedom-so
long, of course, as there exists a real State based on the rule of
law, and we could go so far as to say, so long as a State exists.9
The fact that religious denominations with different features exist,
and even the peculiar configuration of the Catholic Church, with
its own law that is not derived from the State, is once again linked,
in the crystal clear thinking of Francesco Ruffini, to the problems
of religious freedom and equality, or the equality of creeds. "Reli-
gious associations for worship," says Ruffini,
can enter into relations with the State not only in so far as the
State protects their religious freedom, but particularly in so far as
they are organized and governed by charters, like any other asso-
ciation, which not only relate to faith and discipline, but wholly
different matters, wholly secular in character: for example, the
acquisition of property, and its administration.' 0
6. lid. at6.
7. FRANCESCO RUFFINI, Diritti di liberta (Piero Gobetti ed., 1st ed. 1926).
8. PIERO CALAMANDREI, Introduction to FRANCESCO RUFFINI, Diritti di liberta (La
Nuova Italia, Firenze ed., 2d ed. 1946).
9. RUFFIN, Diritti di liberta, supra note 7, at 136.
10. RUFFINI, LA LIBERTA RELIGIOSA COME DIRITTO PUBBLICO ITALIANO, supra note
3, at 13.
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Every religious denomination therefore has its own distinctive and
differing features. "To ensure that religious freedom is truly equal
for all and hence complete in a State, is it really necessary for the
State to treat all the religious associations of worship in a perfectly
identical manner, even in respect of purely temporal affairs?""'
Ruffini answers this question in the negative. Against the princi-
ple "Equality at any price," he sets another: "Governing all une-
qual juridical relations equally is as unjust as unequally governing
all equal juridical relations."' 2 This opens the scientific and con-
ceptual path to a differentiated system for governing relations with
the churches, in accordance with the system under which the pub-
lic authority governs each one proportionally, but always accord-
ing to the canons of freedom. In other words, not by reference to
freedom of conscience and worship, which must necessarily be
equal for all, but only limited to the regime and the forms (interna-
tionally relevant instruments, agreements, Acts of Parliament)
with which these relations are governed in terms of organizational
discipline, and by no means-and I wish to emphasize this point-
in relation to the freedom of conscience and freedom of worship.
This reference to the thought of Francesco Ruffini is not solely
as a due act of homage to this great and courageous liberal demo-
cratic jurist, but because it reveals a few aspects of the influence
that his teaching has exercised over the development of ecclesiasti-
cal law in Italy, and in the governance of relations between the
State and the Church, and between the State and the religious
denominations.
Ruffini was writing-and we would do well to remember this-
before the Reconciliation between the Italian State and the
Church. The 1848 Fundamental Statute of the Kingdom of Sar-
dinia, which subsequently became the Constitution of the King-
dom of Italy in 1861, granted by King Carlo Alberto, took its
inspiration from confessional principals, considering the Catholic
religion as "the only State religion," with the other denominations
that then existed "tolerated according to the laws." This legal pro-
vision did not, however, prevent the Subalpine Parliament from
enacting a law only a few months later, to remove any doubt what-
soever about the civil and political capacity of citizens who did not
profess the Catholic religion, by providing that, "Allegiance to a
different denomination does not create an exception to the enjoy-
11. 1 RUFFINI, La liberta religiosa--Storia dell'idea, supra note 5, at 13.
12. 1 id. at 15.
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ment of civil and political rights and to eligibility for admission to
civilian and military posts."
The confessional rationale of the Statute did not, however, pre-
vent the abolition of the traditional ecclesiastical courts and immu-
nities, or the suppression of Religious Orders and other
ecclesiastical entities, or make it possible to completely suppress
the religious guilds and devolve their assets to the public domain.
In this context, what became known as the "Roman question,"
namely, the domestic and international political dispute caused by
the occupation of Rome by the Kingdom of Italy, and the transfer
of the capital from Florence to Rome (a political question, but nev-
ertheless one that influenced relations between Church and State,
and hence the regime of religious freedom itself), was solved unilat-
erally by a State law which the Holy See never accepted, and which
attributed to the Supreme Pontiff and the Holy See special personal
"guarantees" and immunities.
The Holy See reacted with the famous "non expedit," which,
inter alia, forbid Catholics to vote at the general elections: this was
a great error that adversely affected the whole of the political and
religious life of Italy until 1919!
The same legislative policy subsequently created a special
"Fund," initially made up of the equivalent value of the Church
assets that had been taken over by the Italian State, from which to
pay the clergy a stipend that was essentially equivalent to making
the State their paymaster.
It was with the "Lateran Pacts" executed in 1929 between the
Holy See and the Italian government, which was by then con-
trolled by the Fascist Party, that legislative, and with it ecclesiasti-
cal, policy thinking changed substantially. The Treaty and the
Concordat, which made up those "Pacts," put an end to the "Ro-
man question" once and for all, on a bilateral basis. While the
Treaty assured the Holy See of "absolute and visible indepen-
dence," by creating a territorial entity, Vatican City State, the Con-
cordat, which governed the status of the Church in Italy,
developed the confessional approach, reaffirming the renewed rec-
ognition of the Catholic religion as the State Religion, tempered by
a regime, not a full freedom, but at least of juridical tolerance, in-
herited from the previous liberal democratic age.
The overall design underlying the Concordat guaranteed an area
of freedom for the Church and her organizations within the con-
text of an authoritarian regime, but it did not do away with the
areas of friction in relations with the State, particularly with regard
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to the education of youth and the work of Catholic associations,
with the inevitable political repercussions to which they might give
rise. It was more a means of settling a dispute, and hence staking
out the respective spheres of the State and the Church, than of
enhancing the rights of the person in his twofold capacity as a citi-
zen and a believer.
This new ecclesiastical political-legislative approach was also
broadened, as I mentioned earlier, to the other religious denomina-
tions. The Law of June 24, 1929'3 enacted new "provisions for the
exercise of the denominations admitted into the State and on mar-
riage celebrated before the ministers of these denominations." De-
nominations other than the Catholic Church were no longer
"tolerated," but "admitted," provided that they did not profess
principles and did not re-affirm the old principle that "Allegiance
to a different denomination does not create an exception to the en-
joyment of civil and political rights and to eligibility for admission
to civilian and military posts"' 4 and "there is total freedom of reli-
gious debate."' 5 But the real and total enjoyment of religious free-
dom, under these circumstances, appeared to be constrained by
controls and ultimately restricted in many respects.
It is significant that even in the political and ideological environ-
ment of those years, a particular discipline was dictated for the
Jewish communities and for the Union "designed to look after and
protect the general rights of Jews in the Kingdom."' 6 From the
very first moment, the new law was deemed "perhaps a unique ex-
ample in our legal system of a charter for a religious denomination
drafted and enacted by the State," a real civil constitution of a reli-
gious denomination created by the State legislator, according to the
judgment of Arturo Carlo Jemolo, a great Catholic and liberal
jurist.
A completely new age for religious freedom, with the compre-
hensive recognition of inviolable human rights, dawned with the
1948 Republican Constitution which profoundly innovated the
very foundations of the system of relations between the State and
the Catholic Church; between the State and religious denomina-
tions; and between the State, citizens, and religious communities,
in relation to freedom of religion, conscience, and worship.
13. Legge 24 giugno 1929, n. 1159, in Gazz. Uff., 16 luglio 1929, n. 164.
14. Id. §4.
15. Id. §5.
16. Art. 30 Royal Decree, 30 ottobre 1930, n. 1731, in Gazz. Uff., 15 gennaio 1931, n.
11.
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After the tragic experience of totalitarianism and the havoc
caused by the Second World War, the cultural climate, including
legal culture, emerged completely changed. The year in which the
Italian Constitution was promulgated was also the year of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948). Princi-
ples and positions were affirmed which, as one of Italy's most
original philosophers of law, the Catholic Giuseppe Capograssi,
stated, "are not an arbitrary excogitation of individual or groups,
however authoritative: they are the effect of fundamental needs
felt by contemporary man as a result of the experiences to which he
has been subjected." Along similar lines, the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms became effective on November 4, 1950. The individual and
collective right to freedom of religion, already fully guaranteed by
the Italian Constitution, was further protected by the international
undertakings of the State, with a variety of guarantees in the unity
of juridical experience.
The specific originality of the Italian Constitution, developing
coherently from a pluralist standpoint gives full recognition to the
legal systems of religious denominations and governs relations be-
tween them and the State under bilateral agreements.
It is evident that such far-reaching innovative principles, dic-
tated by the provisions of the Constitution, would have to be devel-
oped at a later stage by a comprehensive renewal of ecclesiastical
law, which has largely been completed over the past few years.
The new approach to dealings between the State and the Catho-
lic Church not only draws on the radical changes that have taken
place in the organization of the State and Italian society itself, but
also on the new thinking on the part of the Church in the wake of
Vatican II. Without proceeding further to analyze this aspect of
the question, we should recall that the Council clearly stated that
"the human person has a right to religious freedom," and that this
freedom is "really based on the very dignity of the human person,"
and consists of immunity "from coercion on the part of individu-
als, social groups and every human power so that, within due lim-
its, nobody is forced to act against his convictions nor restrained
from acting in accordance with his convictions in religious matters
in private or in public, alone or in associations with others."' 7
Equally outspoken, the Council, taking a clear dualistic approach,
spelled out the principles governing relations between the Church
and the community and political institutions. Using an expression
17. Dignitatis Humanae 2 (Dec. 7, 1965).
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that seems to be wholly consonant with the provisions of Article 7
of the Italian Constitution, the Council stated that, "The political
community and the Church are independent and autonomous of
each other in their own fields;" and while using temporal goods to
the extent that her mission requires, the Church "never places its
hopes in any privileges accorded to it by civil authority; indeed, it
will give up the exercise of certain legitimate rights whenever it
becomes clear that their use will compromise the sincerity of its
witness." 18 It is therefore not strange that "in consideration of the
process of political and social change that has occurred in Italy"
and "the developments fostered by the Church since the Second
Vatican Council" (the words of the preamble to the new agreement
signed in February 18, 1984), the State and the Church concluded
a new pact, completely amending and replacing the 1929
Concordat.
The Preamble to the new agreement explains that the Holy See
and the Italian Government "recognized the appropriateness" of
amending the 1929 Concordat. The reasons are both "the process
of political and social change which has occurred in Italy in recent
decades," and the "developments promoted" by Vatican II in the
Church.
There had, in fact, been a change of political regime in Italy; a
new Constitution had been adopted; radical changes had occurred
in mentalities, customs, and also in the religious life; in the Church
a new ecclesiology had been developed, and a new view of relations
between the Church and civil society had come into being.
Since the old Concordat had been influenced by the ideology of
the authoritarian regime and the ecclesiology current at that time,
radical changes were necessary to bring it into line with the princi-
ples enshrined in the Italian Constitution, and with the declara-
tions of Vatican II on religious liberty and relations between the
Church and the political community.
The innovations made to ecclesiastical legislation related signifi-
cantly to other religious denominations, too. This made Article 8
of the Constitution fully effective under a specific provision gov-
erning relations with the religious denominations concerned under
legislation which essentially enacted agreements signed by the gov-
ernment and their representatives. In this way, superseding the old
provision for "admitted denominations," relations were established
with the churches represented by the Tavola Valdese, 9 the Italian
18. Gaudium et Spes 78 (Dec. 7, 1965).
19. Legge 11 agosto 1984, n. 449, in Gazz Uff., 13 agosto 1984, n. 222.
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Union of Christian Seventh Day Adventist Churches,2" the Assem-
blies of God in Italy, 21 and with the Union of Italian Jewish Com-
munities.22 The agreement with the Jewish communities made it
possible for the Union of Italian Jewish Communities to freely
adopt their own autonomous Charter, which superseded the State
legislation governing the Jewish Community in such a singular
manner.
Religious freedom is therefore recognized for what it is: a fun-
damental right of the individual person, but also of the religious
communities that are made up of persons. Religious freedom also
implies the real possibility for the free expression of opinions, free-
dom of worship, and also the freedom to create, develop, and man-
age a whole organization.
The State's duty is to enact legislation to recognize, protect, and
promote the exercise of religious freedom by individuals and
organizations.
In a pluralist and secular society, it is important for the State to
regulate legal relations with religious communities and to enact
common legislation to prevent conflicts. But there are two types of
secular societies: one in which there is a levelling-down of religion
that impoverishes the culture and the civilization of that society in
the name of legal equality; and one in which the identity and spe-
cific features of the various religions and churches are respected
and recognized.
However, the State cannot interfere, ruling on the spiritual and
religious contents of the religious communities, since these "tran-
scend of their very nature the earthly and temporal order of
things." Civil society, "the purpose of which is the care of the
common good in the temporal order, must recognize and look with
favor on the religious life of the citizens. But if it presumes to
control or restrict religious activity, it must be said to have ex-
ceeded the limits of its power."'23
There are countless legal provisions for and practical conse-
quences of the fundamental right to religious freedom. Religious
freedom not only concerns the internal life of individuals and com-
munities, but also their outside action, not only acting as individu-
als, but also their social, charitable, missionary, and organized
20. Legge 22 novembre 1988, n. 516, in Gazz. Uff., 2 dicembre 1988 suppl. ord., n.
282.
21. Legge 22 novembre 1988, n. 517, in Gazz. Uff., 2 dicembre 1988 suppl, ord., n.
283.
22. Legge 8 marzo 1989, n. 101, in Gazz. Uff., 23 marzo 1989 suppl. ord., n. 69.
23. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 17, at 3.
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work, and the problems of maintaining, acquiring, and using prop-
erty. Religious freedom relates, above all, to family life, the par-
ents' responsibilities to educate their children, and the choice of
schools without being required to pay more than all other citizens,
for it is here that genuine legal equality is demonstrated.
In conclusion, this brief account, and these short considerations
bring us back to what I said at the beginning and to an apprecia-
tion of the way in which some of Ruffini's scientific ideas have been
proven and developed in actual experience. If the principle of
equality does not mean "to each the same" but "to each his own,"
this has been done in recent Italian ecclesiastical legislation that
assures full and equal freedom to all religious denominations, seek-
ing to lay down provisions, with the consent of the denominations
concerned, that are congenial to the needs of each one, and accord-
ing to the situations or the different phenomena that require
regulation.
Freedom of religion is thereby recognized, affirmed, and guaran-
teed. But it is always beset by enemies! Enemies such as clerical-
ism, both ecclesiastical and lay, fundamentalism, and proselytism,
that violate the freedom of conscience of individual persons!
Then there is physical and economic violence to religious free-
dom, and psychological, social, and moral violence. All of these
conflict with freedom of conscience and religious freedom, which
are peerless assets to every human society, and authentic condi-
tions for just and peaceful coexistence, and also the guarantees of
civil progress.
But one must also consider the fact that religion and faith are
not, cannot, and must not be indifferent to human and social life.
Individuals and associations can base their social lives on religious
principles and can lead the civil institutions according to the fun-
damental values of man enshrined in religious values.
Religious communities can also conclude agreements, under-
standings, and protocols with the State and civil institutions, ac-
cording to the identity and the nature of their own religious
structures.
If religious freedom is to be a fundamental rule of civil coexis-
tence and to produce general freedom and moral well-being for all
persons and the whole of civil society, the democratic methods
must be put into practice and loyally respected, because the general
rule of freedom also includes religious freedom and democracy,
which are two immense assets and values for the civil progress that
lies ahead of mankind.
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